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The Questionable Viability of the Des
Moines Warranty in Light of Brown-
Forman Corp. v. New York*
The prohibition law, written for weaklings and derelicts, has
divided the nation, like Gaul, into three parts-wets, drys, and
hypocrites.**
INTRODUCTION
Since before the foundation of the Republic, the production,
marketing, and sale of alcoholic beverages have been the subject
of extensive federal and state regulation.' With the passage of the
eighteenth amendment, 2 the ultimate beverage alcohol control, na-
tionwide prohibition,3 came into force. However, widespread
disenchantment 4 with prohibition led to the twenty-first amend-
* Special thanks to Mr. Leon R. "Tim" Timmons, Associate General Counsel of
Brown-Forman Corporation, for his assistance in writing this Comment.
** Mrs. Charles H. Sabin, HomE BOOK OF AmsmcAN QUOTAAONS 329 (Bohle ed.
1967).
1 The first control on liquor sales was a Massachusetts Bay Colony law of 1633,
which forbade the sale of wine or strong water without the permission of the colony
governor or his deputy. The maximum price of beer was fixed at a penny a quart in 1634.
The earliest distillery was erected by New York Director William Kieft on Staten Island in
1640. 2 G. THOMANN, COLONIAL LIQUOR LAWS 4-5, 86 (1887).
2 "After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation
thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for
beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONSr. amend. XVIII, § 1 (1919, repealed
1933). Prohibition was to remain in force "thirteen years, ten months, eighteen days and a
few hours." N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1933, at 1, col. 8.
Distillers were still able to produce alcohol for industrial, sacramental, and, for
those lucky few with a doctor who would prescribe it, medicinal use. National Prohibition
(Volstead) Act 27 U.S.C. §§ 73-85; 16, 27; 17-18 (1919). However, there was a limit on the
latter use to one pint in any ten day period to any one patient. See Lambert v. Yellowley,
272 U.S. 581, 584 (1926). Some eleven million bottles of "medicinal" spirits were prescribed
annually by physicians. G. FORD, FORD'S ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO WINEs, BEERS, AND SPRnus
59 (1983).
1 Prohibition failed for a variety of reasons including a Depression-born need for
excise tax revenues, a resurgence of emphasis upon moderation over total abstinence, and
widespread violation of the law through illicit importation and distilling, often by organized
crime. G. FoRD, supra note 3, at 59-60. For example, within eleven months of commencing
operations following the repeal of prohibition, the Pennsylvania liquor system injected
$1,500,000 into the unemployment relief system of that state. See L. HARRISON & E. LAfE,
AxTER REPEAL 137 (1936).
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ment,5 which allowed alcoholic beverages to return to "respecta-
ble" American homes and businesses under the control of each
state. States were free to decide if alcohol could be produced in or
imported into the state,6 and under what conditions it could be
sold to retailers and hence to consumers.7 Beginning in 1938,
numerous states took actions that effectively established uniform
wholesale prices for liquor across most of the nation.8 Eventually
thirty-nine states took part in this scheme. Using a variety of
formulae, each state required that suppliers affirm that the prices
they were charging for particular products were no higher than
prices being charged elsewhere in the nation.
All states can be divided into two distinct camps regarding the
operation of the alcoholic beverage industry: open states9 and
The amendment provides in part:
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of
the United States is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §§ 1-2.
6 This in large part returned the situation to the pre-18th amendment situation with
each state deciding if it wanted to be "wet" or "dry." Maine had been dry since 1858,
and seventeen other states were to become so by statute or state constitutional amendment
through 1915. C. MERz, THE DRY DECADE 307 (1969). Prohibition had been in effect on
all military bases since 1901. See An Act to Increase the Efficiency of the Permanent
Military Establishment of the United States (Anti-Canteen Act), ch. 192, § 38, 31 Stat. 748,
758 (1901). Many states did not return immediately to "wet" following the passage of the
21st amendment. Oklahoma did not repeal the prohibition clause of the state's original
1907 constitution until April 7, 1959, (OK. CONST. Art. 1, § 7) (1907), repealed by art. 27,
1959), leading to Will Roger's statement that "Oklahomans will vote dry so long as they
can stagger to the polls to vote." R. WALKER & S. PATTERSON, OxaHOMA GOES WET: TE
REPEAL OF PRomIBnoN 1 (1960).
7 No state permits a liquor supplier to sell directly to, or maintain a financial interest
in, a retailer. Interview with Leon Timmons, Associate General Counsel, Brown-Forman
Corp., Louisville, Kentucky, September 27, 1988 [hereinafter Timmons Interview]. See, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1116(a) (1987) ("It shall be unlawful for any manufacturer ... to
(2) Have any direct or indirect financial interest in the business of any alcoholic beverage
retailer."). Likewise, no representative of a supplier may, in a private capacity, hold an
interest in a retailer. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-401 (1977) ("No industry representative
shall hold any interest, stock or ownership directly or indirectly, in any license to sell
products of the industry at retail under privileges of a license or permit to sell any beverage
or liquor in Wyoming or in any premises so licensed.").
& Motion For Leave to File Complaint at 2, Pennsylvania v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 1015
(No. 101 Original) (leave to file complaint denied) (1985).
9 The open states are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mar-
yland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
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control states.'0 In the former, the state licenses commercial whole-
salers to make purchases from suppliers and in turn to supply
various retailers in the state. However, not all states with commer-
cial wholesale operations require suppliers to conform to affirma-
tion price procedures." Control states, on the other hand, maintain
state monopolies upon the importation of some or all alcoholic
beverages,' 2 acting as the wholesalers, and in most cases the retail-
ers, within that state. All eighteen control states require suppliers
to comply with affirmation procedures.
Each state justifies the affirmation requirement on grounds
that intrastate consumers thus obtain the benefits of interstate
competition.' 3 However, the commerce clause 4 forbids any state
to control or otherwise interfere with commerce beyond its borders.
While the twenty-first amendment 5 allows a state to forbid the
importation of alcohol into its borders and to regulate the sale of
alcohol within its borders, it does not preempt the commerce clause
and allow interference with liquor pricing in other states.
Only in the past three decades have the courts examined the
constitutionality of affirmation price requirements. In the first of
these cases, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter,6 the
Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. See DISTILLED SPRITS COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES,
SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS & REGULATIONS RELATING TO DISTILLED SpIuTs, 25th ed., 1985,
various tables [hereinafter DISCUS SuMMARY]. Open states also are referred to as license
states. Timmons Interview, supra note 7.
10 The control states are: Alabama, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. In addition, Montgomery county in
Maryland is a control jurisdiction. Iowa, Mississippi, Oregon, and Wyoming license private
contractors to operate retail outlets with various degrees of state supervision. See DISCUS
SummARY, supra note 9, various tables.
" Those which did not as of December 1, 1985 were: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, North Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin, and the District of
Columbia. See id.
12 A control state is not required to maintain the state monopoly over all categories
(liquor, wine, and beer) of alcoholic beverages. Only Utah controls all three categories
entirely. Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Ohio control only liquor. Alabama, Idaho, Iowa,
Montana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyom-
ing control liquor and wine. Maine, Michigan, and Vermont control liquor and high alcohol
content wines (14%, 21%, and 16% alcohol, respectively), while Vermont also controls
high alcohol content beers (over 6% alcohol). See id.
" See Brief For Appellant at 24-25, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. State of New
York Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (No. 84-2030) [hereinafter Brown-Forman Brief].
14 "The Congress shall have the Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the
several States." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11 See supra note 5.
1 384 U.S. 35 (1966). See infra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
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Court examined New York's affirmation statute vis-a-vis the com-
merce clause and found it to be constitutional. Further tests of
affirmation statutes did not come until the early 1980's. In 1983,
the Court, without comment, affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling
in United States Brewers Association v. Healy,17 which declared
the Connecticut affirmation statute unconstitutional. Then, in the
1986 decision of Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Authority,18 the Supreme Court struck down an entire class
of affirmation statutes.1 9 Subsequently, many such statutes have
been attacked individually and struck down.20 Finally, in Healy v.
Beer Institute, the Court struck down the amended Connecticut
affirmation law and declared Seagram "no longer good law." '2'
Part I of this Comment outlines the history and workings of
price affirmation requirements with particular emphasis upon the
practices used by control states.22 Part II examines the various
decisions prior to Brown-Forman v. New York and those that it
spawned regarding limits on state action that interfere with inter-
state commerce and so violate the commerce clause.2 Part III
examines the Des Moines Warranty, affirmation as practiced by
the control states, looking to the twenty-first amendment and the
state market participant doctrine to see if the Warranty is afforded
protections not available to open state affirmation statutes.24 This
Comment concludes that the Supreme Court should, in light of
the extraterritorial effects of the Des Moines Warranty on interstate
commerce, declare it to be in violation of the commerce clause. 2
7 692 F.2d 275 (2nd Cir. 1982), aff 'd without opinion, 464 U.S. 909 (1983) [herein-
after Healy 1]. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
8 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
,1 See infra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
21 491 U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 2491 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment; Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) [hereinafter Healy II (U.S.)]. See infra notes 88-
95 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 45-103 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 104-51 and accompanying text; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 565.15
(West 1986):
Each month,. . . each American source of supply authorized to sell distilled
spirits to licensed distributors in Florida shall submit to the division a duly
verified affirmation that the net prices charged during the prior month for
such distilled spirits ... were no higher than the lowest net prices ... charged
during the prior month to any distributor in this state, in any other state or
the District of Columbia or to any state or state agency which owns and
operates retail liquor outlets during the previous month.
2 See infra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
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I. THE MECHANICS OF AFFIRmATION
In states where affirmation is required, suppliers must submit
a policy statement affirming that the prices charged wholesalers
for each product shall be no higher than the lowest price charged
elsewhere in the nation. 26 Many states also require the filing of a
price schedule listing the various products, their respective prices,
and the period for which the schedule is effective. 27
Prior to Brown-Forman v. New York,28 thirty-nine states en-
gaged in alcoholic beverage 9 price affirmation" in some form.31
Of these states, twenty are open states in which commercial oper-
ations act as wholesalers between suppliers32 and retailers. Within
these twenty, price affirmation takes three forms: retrospective,
prospective, and simultaneous. These forms are distinguishable
based upon the timing of the affirmation each supplier is to make.
A. Open States
Beginning in 1964, the open states, led by New York, sought
to control supplier prices to wholesalers by requiring price affir-
26 See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
2 A commentator recently stated incorrectly that "[a]ll affirmation statutes begin by
requiring producers to file monthly schedules listing the prices they will charge distributors."
Note, Liquor Price Affirmation Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 86 MicH. L.
REv. 186, 190 (1986). For example, the affirmation statutes of Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 4, § 508a (1985)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-7-100 (Law. Co-op. (1976)),
and Tennessee (TENN. CODE Am. § 57-3-202(e)(1)-(3) (1980)) do not require the posting of
price schedules.
- 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
- Although technically a "liquor" is a distilled spirit, the term is often used in this
Comment synonymously with "alcoholic beverage," as it is this class that is affected most
often by affirmation systems. Where necessary, the distinctions between classes of alcoholic
beverages (liquor, wine, and beer) are made.
" States are often referred to as either affirmation or warranty states. Herein, "af-
firmation" is meant to refer to the general practice of price control at the supplier to
wholesaler (original sale) level. States that engage in this price control are either open or
control states. "Warranty" shall refer to the specifics of price control as used by the control
states.
31 Those states were: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and the eighteen control states. See supra note 10.
12 All major liquor suppliers both produce and market their own products as well as
market those products produced by foreign or domestic corporations that do not maintain
their own distribution networks in the U.S. All importers, distillers, producers of wine, and
wholesalers must hold federal permits from the Secretary of the Treasury. 27 U.S.C. § 203
(1926).
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mation. These regulations take several paths in determining and
defining the period to which the charged prices will be compared.
In retrospective states, the supplier must attest that the price
being charged in that month is no higher than that being charged
elsewhere in the nation in the previous month. 33 Prospective states
require that a supplier attest that the price being charged is no
higher than that being charged elsewhere in the month during which
the price schedule is effective. 34 Simultaneous affirmation is a
subset of prospective affirmation wherein the supplier must attest
that the charged price is no higher than that being charged at that
moment elsewhere in the nation. 35
Should a supplier violate an affirmation statute, the state may
revoke that supplier's license to sell alcoholic beverages within that
state, or the wholesalers involved may seek civil damages. 36
B. Control States
Control states, on the other hand, maintain a loose contractual
relationship with the various suppliers. States are under no obli-
gation to carry the line of any supplier, and acceptance of any
portion of a supplier's line does not obligate the state to purchase
any other portion of the line. The contractual relationship is loose
33 See, e.g., A=uz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-253(a) (1987) ("There shall be filed ... an
affirmation... that the... price of spirituous liquor to wholesalers ... is no higher than
the lowest price at which such item of liquor was sold by the supplier.., to any wholesaler
anywhere in any other state.") (emphasis added). Arizona alone retains a retrospective
affirmation statute. Comment, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Authority: State Liquor Price Statutes Under the Commerce Clause, 30 Asuz. L. REv. 183,
193 (1988). However, this statute is enforced prospectively. Timmons Interview, supra note
7.
14 See, e.g., HAw. Ray. STAT. § 281-122 (1985), "No supplier shall sell ... any item
of liquor at a price which is higher than the lowest price at which such item is currently
being sold .... (emphasis added). This statute has been repealed by the Hawaii legislature
(1988 Haw. Sess. Laws 314 § 1).
" See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-63b(a) (West 1950) (amended 1984) ("At
the time of posting ... [every supplier] shall file ... a written affirmation ... certifying
that [the] ... price ... will be no higher than the lowest price at which each such item
... is or will be sold. .. .") (emphasis added). This is also called "current" or "concur-
rent" affirmation.
36 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE § 23673 (West 1985) ("A violation of this
section shall be remediable only by a civil action for damages .... A judgement [sic] in
any such action rendered against a [supplier] shall be deemed grounds for the suspension
or revocation of the violator's license."); Axuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-253(E) (1987) ("Upon
final judgement [sic] that any person has violated any provision of this article, the super-
intendent may refuse to accept for any period of months not exceeding three calendar
months any affirmation required to be filed by such person.").
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in that a supplier will file the price schedule on a quarterly basis.
This does not obligate the supplier to sell or the state to accept
those products in any subsequent quarter.
In 1938, representatives of thirteen of the then seventeen con-
trol states met in Des Moines, Iowa, to discuss common concerns.3 7
Subsequent to this meeting, all of the control states, including
those not present at the Des Moines meeting, adopted a Virginia
contract provision requiring that the supplier affirm that the prices
being charged to the state would be equal to the lowest being
charged in the nation at that time.3 8 This became known as the
"Des Moines Warranty. 39 The Warranty measures the applicable
price as do prospective affirmation statutes, 40 viz., for the quarter
during which the posted schedule is effective.41 Should a supplier
or a state discover an error in pricing that violates the Warranty,
the contract requires a refund of the difference in charged and
allowed prices to the state or states injured. 42 The Liquor Control
Board (LCB)43 in that state may also "de-list" the supplier, stating
in effect that while the supplier is licensed to import into the state,
the LCB, the only wholesaler within that state, will not purchase
11 Brief In Support Of Motion For Leave To File Complaint at 47-48, Pennsylvania
v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 1015 (No. 101 Original) (leave to file complaint denied) (1985)
[hereinafter Pennsylvania Brief].
Id. at 48.
" See, e.g., Idaho Liquor Vendor's Price Quotations, form PQ-85 ("Prices of mer-
chandise ordered by the Dispensary shall not exceed the lowest prices ... offered to and
paid by any other customer for the same merchandise anywhere in the United States .... ");
Michigan Department of Commerce Liquor Control Commission Liquor Quotation, form
LC-329 ("The prices specified on this Quotation are the lowest base prices offered to any
purchaser in open or monopoly states.") [hereinafter Michigan Quotation Form]; Wyoming
Liquor Commission purchase order ("The Vendor guarantees that Basic Costs... at which
merchandise is quoted ... shall not exceed such Basic Costs quoted by the vendor ... to
any purchaser .. anywhere in the United States of America.").
40 Pennsylvania Brief, supra note 37, at 69-70.
"1 Price schedules are filed quarterly and are effective as of February 1, May 1, August
1, and November 1. See, e.g., N.C. ADIN. CODE tit. 4, r.2.1501 (March 1984).
,1 See, e.g., Michigan Quotation Form ("[Aind if a lower price is offered or given to
any other purchasers the Vendor must refund the difference."); State of Ohio Department
of Liquor Control Price Quotation on Spirituous Liquor, form no. 184 ("Should a lower
price be offered or given to any purchaser during the period this quotation is effective, the
State of Ohio, Department of Liquor Control, will be refunded the difference on all
purchases pursuant to this quotation."); see also Pennsylvania Brief, supra note 37, at 69-
70.
" Each control state maintains an administrative board to oversee the functioning of
the state's wholesale and retail operations. While these boards go by a variety of names,
the abbreviation "LCB" denotes a generic state board.
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from the supplier, thereby shutting the supplier off from the retail
market 4
II. PRICE AFFIRMATION STATUTES AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. Price Affirmation Prior to 1986
Price affirmation did not come under attack with its widespread
enactment in 1938. In fact, with one exception, control state affir-
mation has remained free from litigation.45 However, open state
affirmation was attacked immediately after it appeared. In 1964,
New York passed the first open state affirmation law. 46 Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., a major supplier, immediately brought suit
to enjoin its enforcement and to have it declared unconstitutional.
Seagram based its argument against affirmation on four points: 1)
it is an illegal burden on interstate commerce; 2) it violates federal
antitrust laws; 3) it violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment; and 4) it violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.47 Relying on the twenty-first amendment
as a bulwark against these arguments, the Court ruled that all of
them were meritless. 48
Relying on United States v. Frankfort Distilleries49 and Hostet-
ter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp. ,50 the Court held that a state has
4 See, e.g., N.C. A~roN. CODE tit. 4, r.2.1401 (March 1984) ("Except for special
orders, no purchases of any spirituous liquor, fortified or unfortified wine shall be made
by any local board other than brands approved for resale in ABC stores by the commis-
sion."). The most dramatic case of de-listing to date involved the Joseph E. Seagram
Company by Pennsylvania in 1958. Seagram sought to raise their prices, but the Pennsyl-
vania LCB said the planned increases were unreasonable and demanded that Seagram justify
them. Upon Seagram's refusal to do so, Pennsylvania de-listed all Seagram products.
However, due to consumer demands, the products were returned within six months. See
Ober & Weldon, State Liquor Affirmation Practices: Constitutional and Anti-Trust Prob-
lems, 77 DICK. L. REv. 643, at 648-49 (1972) [hereinafter Liquor Affirmation Practices].
However, in most cases, a de-listing is of one particular brand and is not retributive but a
statement that there is insufficient demand to justify future orders by the LCB. The state
may have a mechanism for ordering non-listed labels for those willing to place special
orders. See, e.g., N.C. ADmN. CODE tit. 4, r.2.1404 (March 1984).
41 See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
46 1964 N.Y. Laws Chapter 531. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter,
384 U.S. 35, 37-41 (1966). This was a retrospective statute.
47 Id. at 41.
41 Id. at 41-42.
49 324 U.S. 293, 299 (1945) ("[The 21st amendment] bestowed upon the states broad
regulatory power over the liquor traffic within their territories."). See infra note 110.
- 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964) ("[A] State is totally unconfined by traditional Commerce
Clause limitations when it restricts the importation of intoxicants destined for use, distri-
bution, or consumption within its borders."). See infra note 111.
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"wide latitude for regulation"51 in the field of alcoholic beverages.
As the statute in question had not yet come into force due to a
series of injunctions, Seagram was unable to demonstrate actual
interference with interstate commerce.52 Additionally, the Court
pointed to the various control states as a way of affirming the
validity of the New York law.5 3 The Court focused on the burden
of proving compliance with any affirmation requirements, noting
that it may be more difficult in control states. However, in doing
so, the Court ignored any burden placed on interstate commerce
by the Warranty, and by implication, New York's statute.
Likewise, the Court dismissed the antitrust, equal protection,
and due process attacks upon the statute as being without merit.5 4
The Court concluded: "Although it is possible that specific future
applications of [the affirmation statute] may engender concrete
problems of constitutional dimension, it will be time enough to
consider any such problems when they arise. We deal here only
with the statute on its face." '5 5 The Court would have to wait
twenty years before it would deal with those concrete problems.
The situation remained unchanged until 1983, when the Su-
preme Court affirmed without comment the Second Circuit in
finding the Connecticut beer affirmation law unconstitutional as
violative of the commerce clause.56 After distinguishing the pro-
spective Connecticut statute from the retrospective statute approved
in Seagram5 7 the circuit court commented upon the failings of the
Seagram decision and its misapplication of precedent, especially
the Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. 8 decision.5 9 However, the pe-
culiarities of the Connecticut statute limited the applicability of
this opinion to the balance of state affirmation laws! 0
In 1985, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania attempted to file
an original jurisdiction suit in the Supreme Court against all other
51 Seagram, 384 U.S. at 42.
52 Id. at 41.
5 Id. at 43-45.
, Id. at 45-51.
, Id. at 52.
16 U.S. Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275 (2nd Cir. 1982), aff'd without opinion,
464 U.S. 909 (1983) [hereinafter Healy 1].
, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
" 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
Healy I, 692 F.2d at 283-84.
60 Id. at 276. The Connecticut statute tied the minimum beer price to the lowest at
which the product in question was sold in any of the three adjoining states of Massachusetts,
New York, and Rhode Island.
1989-90]
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affirmation states, both open and control, alleging violation of the
commerce clause. Pennsylvania maintained:
[T]he national price affirmation system prevents, as intended, the
normal operation of the free market and replaces it with a system
of state regulation resulting in uniform prices to all wholesalers
in all thirty-eight affirmation states.
Faced with the extraterritorial impact of each such pricing
decision, interstate suppliers forego competition in local markets,
thereby restricting the free flow of goods in interstate commerce. 61
The Supreme Court, without comment, denied Pennsylvania leave
to file the complaint. 62
B. Brown-Forman v. New York
In 1981, Brown-Forman brought suit against the New York
Liquor Control Board asserting the unconstitutionality of the New
York affirmation statute.63 Justice Marshall characterized Brown-
Forman's argument:
By requiring distillers to affirm that they will make no sales
anywhere in the United States at a price lower than the posted
price in New York, . . New York makes it illegal for a distiller
to reduce its price in other States during the period that the
posted New York price is in effect. Appellant contends that this
constitutes direct regulation of interstate commerce. 4
Additionally, the law was attacked for fostering inconsistent
and contradictory obligations on suppliers by interpreting certain
promotional allowances in other states that were forbidden in New
61 Complaint at 32 and 34, Pennsylvania v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 1015 (No. 101 Original)
(leave to file complaint denied) (1985) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Complaint]. An action of
lesser scope had been filed earlier with the Court, also of original jurisdiction, and likewise
had been denied. See Pennsylvania v. New York, 410 U.S. 978 (No. 60 Original) (leave to
file complaint denied) (1973).
62 Pennsylvania v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 1015 (1985).
63 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 473 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421-22
(1984). The trial action was commenced when New York accused Brown-Forman of violating
the affirmation statute by not adjusting prices to New York wholesalers to account for the
promotional allowances made in other states.
61 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579-80 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring; Stevens, J., dissenting). New York required that,
on the 25th of each month, each supplier file a price schedule to be effective for the second
succeeding month. The supplier was barred from selling the products at a lower price
anywhere else in the nation during that future month.
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York as discounts in the base price. 65 New York demanded that
prices be adjusted to account for these promotional payments
despite the fact they were not tied to specific sales or to purchase
requirements upon the wholesaler to whom they were given. 66 Such
an adjustment, however, would have placed Brown-Forman in
violation of the affirmation statutes of the other states, as they did
not view the promotional allowances as discounts that need be
taken into account when calculating the floor price.67
Brown-Forman lost in both the New York Supreme Court 68
and the New York Court of Appeals.69 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the lower court decisions were reversed and the statute was
struck down as violative of the commerce clause.70
The Court identified a two-tier process to test for violations of
the commerce clause. The first tier looks at statutes that "directly
regulate[] or discriminate[] against interstate commerce ... [or
that] favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests." 7'
These are per se invalid.72 The second tier looks at those statutes
that are not per se invalid to see if the state's interest is legitimate
and if the burden on interstate commerce exceeds the local bene-
fits.7 3 Under either level, the "critical consideration is the overall
effect of the statute on both local and interstate activity." 74 Brown-
Forman did not maintain that the statute was less than evenhanded;
all suppliers were treated equally. But this treatment did amount
to " 'simple economic protectionism' that th[e] Court has routinely
forbidden. ' 7 5 In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,76 the Court struck
65 Id. at 577-78.
16 Id. at 578.
67 Id.
6See supra note 63.
,Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 64 N.Y.2d 479 (1985).
70 Brown-Forman v. New York, 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
11 Id. at 579.
7 See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
71 Brown-Forman v. New York, 476 U.S. at 579. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970). Arizona sought to compel a cantaloupe grower to pack the fruit in-state
because the packaging carried the name of the state where the fruit was packed. By contrast,
the name of the state where the fruit was grown was not listed. The cost of moving the
packaging facility thirty-one miles was approximately $200,000. "Even where the State is
pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden on commerce has been
declared to be virtually per se illegal." Id. at 145 (emphasis in original).
-, Brown-Forman v. New York, 476 U.S. at 579.
71 Id. at 580.
76 294 U.S. 511. See also Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315 (1925) (state action
meant to prevent competition in supply of for-hire vehicles used in interstate commerce
1989-901
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down a New York law that specified a minimum wholesale price
for milk, and banned from resale in New York foreign milk pur-
chased at a lower price. The Court held that "a State may not
'establish ... a scale of prices for use in other states, and ... bar
the sale of products ... unless the scale has been observed.' "7
The Court then was left to ascertain if the New York affirmation
statute did regulate commerce in other states.
The New York statute required that prices be posted each
month, 78 in effect allowing changes to those postings only with the
approval of the liquor board. Were a supplier to raise or lower its
prices in all other affirmation states during a particular posting
period, the supplier could not change correspondingly its New York
prices without regulatory approval. But were it denied permission
to modify its price schedule, the supplier would be in violation of
the affirmation requirement. The Court wrote: "Forcing a mer-
chant to seek regulatory approval in one State before undertaking
a transaction in another directly regulates interstate commerce. 7 9
The practical effect of the law was to regulate liquor prices in
other states, 0 which directly violates the commerce clause.
New York maintained that the twenty-first amendment pro-
tected the affirmation law from commerce clause analysis. How-
ever, the Court noted that the twenty-first amendment refers to
alcoholic beverages within a state, and New York's law controls
alcoholic beverages in other states, thereby exceeding the authority
granted by the amendment even if it was completely insulated from
the commerce clause." Also, by interfering with the alcoholic bev-
violates commerce clause); H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949) (state
prevention of expansion by a corporation on the grounds it would reduce milk supplies in
the local market and result in destructive competition burdens interstate commerce); New
England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982) (state requirement that
utility sell low cost, in-state generated power to state residents or adjust rates for power
purchased elsewhere to the same price is protectionist and burdens interstate commerce).
" Brown-Forman v. New York, 476 U.S. at 580 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935)). See also DuMond, 336 U.S. at 532 ("[T]he State may not
promote its own economic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate com-
merce.").
71 Id. at 575-76.
19 Id. at 582-83. The Court did not believe the states would be willing to freely allow
changes to these schedules, and pointed to New York's refusal to grant Brown-Forman such
permission as an example.
I0 d. at 583 ("That the ABC Law is addressed only to sales of liquor in New York
is irrelevant if the 'practical effect' of the law is to control liquor prices in other States.")
(emphasis added).
1, Id. at 584-85.
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erage industry in other states, New York invaded the authority
granted to other states by the twenty-first amendment.82
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, stated that the
Court should take the additional step of overruling Seagram di-
rectly: "I see no principled distinction that can be drawn for
constitutional analysis between New York's current prospective
statute and the same State's retroactive statute upheld in Sea-
gram .... Our failure to overrule Seagram now merely preserves
uncertainty and will breed or necessitate future litigation." 83
C. Price Affirmation After Brown-Forman v. New York
Since the Brown-Forman v. New York decision, several other
open state affirmation laws have been adjudged unconstitutional.
In Brown-Forman Corp. v. South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage
Control Commission,8 South Carolina's simultaneous affirmation
statute was declared unconstitutional. In Brown-Forman Corp. v.
New Mexico Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,5 a similar
New Mexico statute was declared unconstitutional. Both decisions
relied heavily upon Brown-Forman v. New York.8 6 Yet another
affirmation statute fell in Brown-Forman Corp. v. Delaware Al-
coholic Beverage Control Commission.8 7
Id. at 585.
83 Id. at 586. In a footnote to its opinion, the majority wrote: "[W]e do not necessarily
attach constitutional significance to the difference between a prospective statute and the
retrospective statute at issue in Seagram." Id. at 584 n.6. A dissenting opinion written by
Justice Stevens and joined by Justices White and Rehnquist argued that the New York
statute was permissible under the 21st amendment and Seagram, and that actual interference
with interstate commerce had not been shown. Id. at 586-92. That both retrospective and
prospective affirmation policies burden interstate commerce was demonstrated in Pustay &
Zardkoohi, An Economic Analysis of Liquor Price Affirmation Laws: Do They Burden
Interstate Commerce?, 48 LA. L. REv. 649 (1988) [hereinafter Economic Analysis]. "[T]he
impact of an affirmation law adopted by one state will be transmitted to other states,
affecting prices charged in other states in the process. This impact on interstate commerce
is inherent in any law that ties prices in one state to prices in another state." Id. at 674
(emphasis added).
643 F. Supp. 943 (D.S.C. 1986).
672 F. Supp. 1383 (D.N.M. 1987).
Brown-Forman v. South Carolina, 643 F. Supp. 943, 948-49 (D.S.C. 1986); Brown-
Forman v. New Mexico, 672 F. Supp. 1383, 1385 (D.N.M. 1987).
No. 87-20 LON, slip op. (D. Del. Dec. 17, 1987). The Delaware court wrote:
[The Delaware statute] plainly affects Plaintiff's decision to respond to
the demographics of local markets. Rather than being able to respond to the
demands and needs of a particular market, the Plaintiff is forced towards a
uniform national pricing policy. As a result, the citizens of other states may
very well lose out on competitive pricing.
Id. at 14.
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Since Brown-Forman v. New York, the Court again has had
opportunity to review the issue of price affirmation and again
found it in violation of the commerce clause. In Healy v. Beer
Institute, s8 the Court reexamined the Connecticut affirmation law.
The law, originally struck down in United States Brewers Ass'n v.
Healy, 9 was amended with the intent of correcting its constitutional
infirmities; 90 the new law mandated simultaneous affirmation. 91 The
district court upheld the amended law, 92 but the circuit court struck
it down.93 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second
Circuit, using the opportunity to both clarify and expand its orig-
inal Brown-Forman decision.
The Court found,
that the Connecticut statute has the undeniable effect of control-
ling commercial activity occurring wholly outside the boundary
of the State. Moreover, the practical effect of this affirmation
law, in conjunction with the many other beer pricing and affir-
mation laws ... is to create just the kind of competing and
interlocking local economic regulation that the Commerce Clause
was meant to preclude. 94
- 491 U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 2491 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment; Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) [hereinafter Healy II (U.S.)].
9 692 F.2d 275 (1982), aff'd without opinion, 464 U.S. 909 (1983) [hereinafter Healy
1]. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
See Healy 11 (U.S.), 491 U.S. at - , 109 S. Ct. at 2495; Healy v. Beer Institute,
849 F.2d 753, 755-56 (2d Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Healy 11 (2nd Cir.)].
9- Healy II (U.S.), 491 U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. at 2495 (1989).
92U.S. Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 669 F. Supp. 543 (D. Conn. 1987).
91 See Healy I (2nd Cir.), 849 F.2d 753.
9 Healy 11 (U.S.), 109 S. Ct. at 2500. The Court went on to note that:
[t]he short-circuiting of normal pricing decisions based on local market con-
ditions would be carried to a national scale if and when a significant group
of States enacted contemporaneous affirmation statutes that linked in-state
prices to the lowest price in any State in the country. This kind of potential
regional and even national regulation of the pricing mechanism for goods is
reserved by the Commerce Clause to the Federal Government and may not be
accomplished piecemeal through the extraterritorial reach of individual state
statutes.
Id. at 2501. The Court also found the law in violation of the commerce clause in that it
discriminated against "brewers and shippers of beer engaged in interstate commerce ...
who sell both in Connecticut and in at least one border State or out-of-state shippers who
sell both in Connecticut and in at least one border State." Id. The Court ruled that "[t]his
discriminatory treatment establishes a substantial disincentive for companies doing business
in Connecticut to engage in interstate commerce, essentially penalizing Connecticut brewers
if they seek border-state markets and out-of-state shippers if they choose to sell both in
Connecticut and in a border State." Id. at 2501-2.
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In an effort to insure that the issue of price affirmation does not
reappear before the Court, the majority wrote:
In the interest of removing any lingering uncertainty about the
constitutional validity of affirmation statutes and of avoiding
further litigation on the subject of liquor-price affirmation, we
recognize today what was all but determined in Brown-Forman:
to the extent that Seagram holds that retrospective affirmation
statutes do not facially violate the Commerce Clause, it is no
longer good law.9
The lone dissent from the general move away from affirmation
statutes has come from the Sixth Circuit. Overturning the district
court, 96 the appellate bench upheld the validity of the Tennessee
simultaneous statute. 97 Departing from the "practical effect" anal-
ysis used by the court below as well as by other courts that have
examined this issue,98 the court of appeals focused on the specifics
"1 Id. at 2502.
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, held that the Connecticut statute was facially
invalid on the basis of discrimination against interstate commerce and "that today's decision
requires us to overrule [Seagram]," but refrained from "applying the more expansive
analysis which finds the law unconstitutional because it regulates or controls beer pricing
in the surrounding States .... since this priciple is both dubious and unnecessary to decide
the present case." Id. at 2503-4.
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist observed: "Neither the parties nor the Court point to any concrete evidence that the
Connecticut regulation will have any effect on the beer prices charged in other States, much
less a constitutionally impermissible one." Id. at 2505. Citing to California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980), see infra note 110, and Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), see infra note 109, the Chief Justice wrote: "Even the most
restrictive view of the Twenty-First Amendment should validate Connecticut's efforts to
obtain from interstate brewers prices for its beer drinkers which are as favorable as the
prices which those brewers charge in neighboring States." Id. at 2506.
9 Brown-Forman Corp. v. Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, No. 3-86-0926
(M.D. Tenn. June 30, 1987) (available on WESTLAW, 1987 WL 30303). "What is clear to
this Court is that the 'practical effect' of Tennessee's affirmation statute ... is to control
the prices of Brown-Forman products in other states. It is clear that if a liquor distiller...
desires to raise its prices in Tennessee, it must raise its prices first in every other state in
which the product is sold. Tennessee's affirmation statute works to deny customers in other
states the benefits of a free competitive market." Id. at 11.
VI Brown-Forman Corp. v. Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 860 F.2d 1354
(6th Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded, 491 U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989). Subse-
quently, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light
of Healy II (U.S.), Brown-Forman Corp. v. Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 883
F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1989). The original order against the Tennessee Statute was reinstated
by the district court. Brown-Forman Corp. v. Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, No.
3-86-0926 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 6, 1989).
" See, e.g., Brown-Forman v. New York, 476 U.S. at 583; Healy II (2nd Cir.), 849
F.2d at 758-59; Brown-Forman v. South Carolina, 643 F. Supp. at 949; Brown-Forman v.




of the law struck down in Brown-Forman v. New York,99 quanti-
fication of market distortions, 100 and the continued viability of
Seagram.10 However, the Sixth Circuit's reasoning failed to move
the Supreme Court. On appeal, the Court granted certiorari and,
clearly indicating the direction in which the ruling should be mod-
ified, vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the circuit
court for further consideration in light of the Court's recent Healy
II ruling. 0 2 Notwithstanding this single exception, the general trend
appears to be "that the reasoning of the Brown-Forman Distillers
opinion has closed the coffin on price affirmation laws and left
the burial to the district courts."' 10 3
See Brown-Forman v. Tennessee, 860 F.2d at 1359.
10 See id. at 1358. "The evidence presented by Brown-Forman did not quantify the
market distortions attributed to the Tennessee statute. In terms of dollars and cents, ...
the practical effect ... on Brown-Forman's bottom line and ... the pocketbooks of
consumers ... remain[s] unknown." Such an exact finding of market distortions has not
been required by the Supreme Court or any other court that has had this issue before it.
In fact, it may be impossible to quantify these market distortions.
Price affirmation laws or policies have been utilized for several decades in
thirty-nine states. Decoupling the effect of price affirmation empirically re-
quires accurate information in each state about demand, price elasticity of
demand, and marginal costs before and after price affirmation was imposed.
We submit this is an enormous, if not impossible, empirical undertaking.
Pustay & Zardkoohi, supra note 83, at 672-73 (citation omitted).
"I, See id. at 1362 (quoting Regan, Siamese Essays, 85 MicH. L. REv. 1865, at 1905)
("[T]he type of retrospective affirmation laws upheld in Seagram 'do not violate the
extraterritoriality principle.' "). The court failed to recognize that the simultaneous Ten-
nessee statute is more closely related to the prospective statute of Brown-Forman v. New
York than the retrospective statute of Seagram. See supra notes 33-35.
102 See Brown-Forman Corp. v. Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 491
U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989).
101 Brown-Forman v. New Mexico, 672 F. Supp. at 1385. The Brown-Forman decision
referred to is the New York decision. Florida's affirmation statute (FLA. STAT. ANN. §
565.15 (West 1986)) was held facially unconstitutional in Brown-Forman Corp. v. Bosanko,
No. 87-40321-MP, slip op. (N.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 1989). The Kansas affirmation statute (KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1112 (1986)) -was "rendered unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court's action in striking down similar (if not identical) New York law." 86-114 Op. Att'y
Gen. at 5 (August 7, 1986). Nebraska's statute, (NEB. REv. STAT. § 53-170.02 (1984)),
"[b]ased upon . . . foregoing court decisions ... is unconstitutional." 87044 Op. Att'y
Gen. at 3 (April 2, 1987). New Jersey Alcoholic Beverage Control Bulletin 2447 (October
20, 1986) cited an Attorney General's opinion and stated that the state's affirmation statute
(N.J. ADmIN. CODE tit. 13, § 2-24.5(a)(3) (1986)) would no longer be enforced. Maryland
administratively had declined to enforce their regulation (03.02.01.13). The Massachusetts
Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission, in a press release of September 26, 1986, stated:
"Because [MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 138, § 25D] is virtually identical to the invalidated New
York statute, the Commission will ... no longer enforce those provisions." A private letter
from the Rhode Island Liquor Control Administration (August 4, 1986) stated that the
state's affirmation statute (R.I. GEN. LAws § 3-6-14.1 (1987)) is "constitutionally invalid."
The Minnesota statute (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.307(3) (West 1972)) was repealed (1987
[VOL. 78
1989-901 DES MonES WARRANTY
III. THE DES MOIES WARRANTY VIS-A-VIs THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE
As the coffin closes upon price affirmation statutes, the con-
tinued viability of the Des Moines Warranty is called into question.
Is the Warranty equally violative of the commerce clause? Is it
Minn. Laws 311). The Hawaii statute (HAw. REV. STAT. § 281-122 (1985)) was likewise
repealed (1987 Haw. Sess. Laws 314).
As of October 1989, the remaining open states with affirmation laws are: Arizona
(ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-253 (1987)); California (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23673
(West 1985)); Georgia (Rule 560-2-3-.47); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 364(G) (West
1989)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 369.435 (1987)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37,
§ 536.1 (West Supp. 1 1989)); and South Dakota (S.D. CODIFMD LAWS ANN. § 35-4-95
(1986)).
There also remains the issue of the federal affirmation law, which is entitled the
Department of Defense Armed Services Military Club and Package Store Regulation. It
provides: "[Tihe purchase of all alcoholic beverages for resale at any camp, post, station
base or other DOD installation within the United States shall be in such a manner and
under such conditions as shall obtain for the government the most advantageous contract,
price and other considered factors." 32 C.F.R. § 261.4 (1986). These purchases must be
made from "the most competitive source, price and other factors considered." 10 U.S.C.
§ 2488(a)(1) (1987). Military bases are permitted to purchase liquor from sources, usually
suppliers, located outside the state in which the base is situated. In an effort to prevent
diversion of this liquor to the state market, diversion which took place as a result of the
lower price resulting from the avoidance of the distributor's markup, North Dakota enacted
a regulation requiring an identification label "on each individual item that shall be for
consumption within the federal enclave exclusively." N.D. ADMwn. CODE § 84-02-01-05(7)
(1986). Purchases made from North Dakota distributors were exempt from the labeling
requirement. The military bases in North Dakota are not federal jurisdictions. Estimating
that the regulation would add $200,000 to $250,000 to the cost of liquor purchased each
year, the federal government brought suit asserting that the regulation conflicted with the
federal law and was therefore invalid by virtue of the supremacy clause. United States v.
North Dakota, 675 F. Supp. 555 (D.N.D. 1987). At the trial level, acting upon a motion
for summary judgment, the court held for the state, ruling that the regulation did not
prevent the base facility from seeking the most advantageous price. Id. at 557. Additionally,
supporting the state's twenty-first amendment right to regulate the alcoholic beverage
industry within its borders, the court ruled that:
When the State's significant interest in preventing unlawful diversion of al-
coholic beverages into its stream of commerce is measured against the federal
government's interest in keeping its costs down, it is clear that the federal
government's interest is not of the same stature as the goals defined by the
State.
Id. at 559.
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the trial court was reversed, it having been determined
that "the balancing of state and federal interests would lead us to conclude that the State's
regulations are pre-empted by federal law." United States v. North Dakota, 856 F.2d 1107,
at 1112 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3033 (U.S. August 1, 1989) (No. 88-
926). While the state has the authority to prevent unlawful diversion of liquor to its stream
of commerce, "[s]uch regulation must not extend beyond what is reasonably necessary to
protect the State's interest .... Id. at 1114 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court will
be the final arbiter of this dispute.
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even fair to compare the two systems in light of the different
manners of enactment? Does the twenty-first amendment protect
the state monopolies it fostered in a way that affirmation statutes
are not protected? These issues are addressed below.
A. Affirmation Statutes and the Des Moines Warranty
On at least two occasions, the courts have indicated that affir-
mation statutes and the Des Moines Warranty are similar in con-
stitutional posture; that is, the distinction between a statute and
an administrative contract requirement is not determinative. First,
in the Seagram decision, the Court noted that "the regulatory
procedure followed by New York is comparable to that practiced
by those States ... in which liquor is sold by the State itself and
not by private enterprise."' 1 4 Second, in Brown-Forman v. South
Carolina,0 5 the district court noted the similarities between affir-
mation statutes and the Des Moines Warranty: "Eighteen states,
termed 'control states,' purchase all alcoholic beverages that will
be sold within their borders. The control states' purchase agree-
ments with producers of alcoholic beverages contain price warran-
ties that, in effect, are like South Carolina's Affirmation Statute." 06
The court continued: "The common element of these statutes and
contract provisions is that all require a producer of alcoholic
beverages to affirm that its prices in that state are no higher than
in any other state."' 0 7 From these statements it would appear valid
to compare price affirmation statutes and the Des Moines War-
ranty, and to scrutinize the latter under the same test as the former.
B. The Twenty-First Amendment
Whether the twenty-first amendment treats the Des Moines
Warranty differently from state affirmation statutes is a bit more
difficult to answer. However, it would appear that the twenty-first
,0, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 43 (1966).
,05 643 F. Supp. 943 (D.S.C. 1986).
,0 Id. at 947.
,o7 Id. See also Pennsylvania Brief, supra note 37, at 47-48 (Price affirmation statutes
and the Warranty are, in effect, identical); Jurisdictional Statement at 14, Healy v. Beer
Inst., 491 U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2491 (1989) ("[Alffirmation laws are still being enforced
or defended in court in seven license states, and it exists in contract requirements in eighteen
control states.") (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Jurisdictional Statement]. In Economic
Analysis, supra note 83, no differentiation was made between the interstate effect of
affirmation statutes and the Warranty, nor was one made in Liquor Affirmation Practices,
supra note 144.
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amendment will not protect the Des Moines Warranty anymore
than it did the various price affirmation statutes. Although early
decisions regarding the scope of the twenty-first amendment rec-
ognized it as granting "plenary power on the States to regulate the
liquor trade within their boundaries,' 10 8 the Court now sees the
amendment as being circumscribed by other provisions of the Con-
stitution. 1°9 Additionally, the Court has recognized that the liquor
industry is not exempt from federal controls based on the com-
merce clause such as the Sherman Antitrust Act.110 Rather, the
twenty-first amendment is seen as granting to the states the right
to dictate w]at, if any, alcoholic beverages can be imported into
the state and who is to be permitted to import and sell those
beverages once they arrive in the state where they will be con-
sumed."' The twenty-first amendment will protect a state's right
to maintain a monopoly upon liquor importation and sale, but
that monopoly is not permitted to violate constitutional and stat-
utory provisions to which other monopolies must adhere.
However, it is not enough to say that, whereas the Des Moines
Warranty is similar to price affirmation statutes, it must automat-
ically be violative of the commerce clause because the two systems
'0 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 352 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (1987).
See, e.g., Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); State Board of Equalization v.
Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936); Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944).
'*9 See 324 Liquor, 479 U.S. at 346. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S.
116, 122 n.5 (1982) (establishment clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204-209 (1976)
(equal protection clause); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (procedural
due process); Dep't of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1964) (export-
import clause); Bacchus Imports, LTD. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (commerce clause).
110 See, e.g., 324 Liquor, 479 U.S. 335 (New York minimum retail price mark-up
statute found to violate Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et. seq (1898)); California
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (retail price
maintenance structure in violation of Sherman Antitrust Act); United States v. Frankfort
Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945) (suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers conspiring to fix prices
in Colorado violated Sherman Antitrust Act).
"1 324 Liquor, 479 U.S. at 346. This is not to say that a state can exert controls over
alcoholic beverages passing through the state but not destined for consumption therein
beyond reasonable measures to prevent diversion to the state market. See Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964) (liquors and wines paid for by
departing passengers at New York Port Authority but delivered to purchasers at foreign
point of destination not controlled by New York liquor control law). See also Collins v.
Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938) (state may not prohibit importation of
alcoholic beverages into national park over which the state has ceded exclusive sovereignty
to the federal government); United States v. State Tax Comm'n of Mississippi, 412 U.S.
363 (1973) (state may not tax or otherwise regulate alcoholic beverages bought by military
directly from suppliers for sale on military bases that are exclusive federal jurisdictions).
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are not identical in the way they must be analyzed under the
commerce clause.
C. The State Market Participant Doctrine
Traditionally, the commerce clause has been read to prevent
states from discriminating against foreign interest to the benefit of
the residents of that state. This has been held to violate the com-
merce clause per se. In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,"2 the
Court examined a New Jersey statute that prohibited the shipment
of foreign waste into New Jersey's landfills while allowing those
landfills to continue to receive waste produced in New Jersey. The
Court found that the law violated the commerce clause because it
isolated one state in the stream of commerce from a problem shared
by all states.11 3 The commerce clause is meant to prevent the
economic balkanization of the several states. As Justice Cardozo
stated, "the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together
[because] in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and
not division.' ' 1 4
However, the courts have created an exception to this rule in
the state market participant doctrine. This doctrine holds that when
a state actively participates in, rather than merely regulates, a
market, the state takes on the constitutional posture of a private
party, thus shielding it from commerce clause scrutiny and allowing
the state to discriminate against interstate commerce to the same
degree allowed a private party. This doctrine is seen most clearly
in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap,"5 Reeves v. Stake," 6 and White v.
Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers."7
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, the Maryland legislature passed
a law offering a bounty on abandoned cars that were brought to
processors for reduction into scrap metal and forwarded to steel
112 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
M, Id. at 629.
"' Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). See also Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794, 807 (footnote omitted) (1976) ("The [Commerce] Clause
was designed in part to prevent trade barriers that had undermined efforts of the fledgling
States to form a cohesive whole following their victory in the Revolution."); CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) ("The principle objects of dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce.").
I' 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
,,6 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
460 U.S. 204 (1983).
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mills for recycling."18 A Virginia processor brought suit seeking to
have the law declared unconstitutional as a burden on interstate
trade and violative of the commerce clause. 119 However, after re-
citing the per se test outlined in Philadelphia v. New Jersey,120 and
the balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,'121 the
Court concluded that these did not apply because Maryland was
participating in the market rather than regulating it. The Court
noted that "Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks,
nor to regulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead,
it has entered into the market itself to bid up their price." '
Acknowledging the novelty of this situation, the Court continued:
[U]ntil today the Court has not been asked to hold that the entry
by the State itself into the market as a purchaser, in effect, of a
potential article of interstate commerce creates a burden upon
that commerce if the State restricts its trade to its own citizens
or businesses within the State.
We do not believe the Commerce Clause was intended to
require independent justification for such action. 2 3
Reeves v. Stake dealt with disposition of the output of a South
Dakota cement plant that was owned by the state. In 1978, antic-
ipating a shortage of cement, the state cement commission declared
that it would fill orders from South Dakota customers first, and
foreign orders would be filled on a first-come, first-served basis.'24
Reeves, a long time Wyoming customer of the plant, was cut off
and suffered severe economic losses.'2 He maintained that the
restrictions favoring South Dakota customers were protectionist
and in violation of the commerce clause. 26 However, the Court
"I Hughes, 426 U.S. at 801. In-state scrap metal processors could receive a bounty
after production of an indemnity agreement from the person who had supplied the car to
the processor. Out-of-state processors had stricter documentation requirements. This had
the effect of causing more cars to be taken to Maryland processors who could qualify for
the bounty more easily and who were therefore more likely to compensate their suppliers.
Id. at 801-02.
437 U.S. 617 (1978).
-21 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
122 Hughes, 426 U.S. at 806.
2 Id. at 808-09.
', Reeves, 447 U.S. at 431-33. Built in 1920, the plant was meant to supply the cement
needs of state public works projects with the remainder available for commercial purchase
by citizens of South Dakota. Within a short time, the plant's production exceeded in-state
need, and out-of-state purchasers began to buy from the plant.




noted "the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer,
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.'
2 7
Furthermore, "state proprietary activities may be, and often are,
burdened with the same restrictions imposed on private market
participants. Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting as pro-
prietors, States should similarly share existing freedoms from fed-
eral constraints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce
Clause."12
In White v. Massachusetts Construction Employers, the mayor
of Boston, Massachusetts, issued an executive order requiring that,
in all construction projects funded wholly or partially by the city,
one half of the work force had to be bona fide residents of
Boston. 129 The Court determined that, in this case, Boston was
acting as a market participant in that it expended its own tax
revenues and the employees affected were, at least figuratively,
employees of the city. 130 The city was seeking employees for city
projects, though the various contractors overseeing the construction
did the actual hiring. Thus, the city could require that at least one
half of the Boston tax revenues used to pay for the projects be
returned to Bostonians in the form of wages.
The common element in these cases is that the state has entered
a market and is spending its own money while competing with
other entities for the goods of that market.' 31 Doubtless, a certain
number of cars were processed into scrap outside of Maryland,
cement was produced elsewhere than the South Dakota plant, and
construction workers were hired without the largess of the city of
Boston.
D. The Monopoly Exception to the State Market Participant
Doctrine
The potential for using the state market participant doctrine to
shield control states from commerce clause scrutiny is obvious.
132
, Id. at 438-39 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
I's Id. at 439.
2 White, 460 U.S. at 205-06.
Mo Id. at 211 n.7. Note that this shielding from commerce clause scrutiny did not arise
simply as the result of a contractual agreement between the city and the contractors. See
Shell Oil v. City of Santa Monica, 830 F.2d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing to South-
Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97 (1984)) ("[Clontractual privity does
not insulate a state or local body from Commerce Clause scrutiny.").
"I Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1193 (1986).
"I See Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 107, at 16. "Moreover, when the state acts
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The state is making purchases from commercial entities, viz., liquor
suppliers, and is using its own revenues to pay for the products
ordered. However, on closer analysis, the protection offered con-
trol state monopolies by the state market participant doctrine fails.
The Ninth Circuit has identified an exception to the state
market participant doctrine for state controlled monopolies. In
Western Oil & Gas Association v. Cory,1 3 the Ninth Circuit ana-
lyzed a California statute that specified manners of calculating rent
for tidal lands over which certain oil companies operated pipe-
lines. 34 Various oil producers and processors brought suit to have
these rents declared an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce.1 3 The state maintained that its actions were shielded from
commerce clause scrutiny because it was participating in the market
by renting out those lands, and competing with other property
holders for leases.136 While acknowledging the existence of the state
market participant doctrine, citing to White and Reeves,17 the court
held that the doctrine did not apply in this case. 38 California was
not a true market participant as it "owns and controls tide lands
and submerged lands in its sovereign capacity.' 1 39 Those seeking
to enter the market as lessees cannot "shop around" as there are
"no other competitor[s] to which they can go."' 4 The court noted
that the state commission had a complete monopoly and that the
companies involved had no choice but to deal with the state.' 41
The court concluded: "This control over the channels of interstate
commerce permits the State to erect substantial impediments to the
free flow of commerce."' 142
as a market participant, it is free to favor its own citizens. Affirmation is mandated in the
control states. To outlaw an even-handed and narrowly drafted affirmation law in license
states, merely because the state is not a market participant, emphasizes form over sub-
stance." (citations omitted).
13 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd without opinion, 471 U.S. 81 (1985).
I' Id. at 1341-42. The oil in transit from these pipelines largely was the product of








141 Id. While alternatives were available, such as the construction of new pipelines over
land not owned by the state, the economic feasibility of those alternatives was insufficient
to persuade the court. Although Western Oil could have entirely abandoned the California
market, thereby completely avoiding the issue, this is not mentioned as an option.
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A similar situation arose in Shell Oil v. City of Santa Monica,143
in which the city attempted to alter the formula for setting rents
for pipelines under city-owned property. Santa Monica, California,
argued that it was selling a commodity (easements) and competing
with other parties in supplying Shell Oil's needs. 144 However, fol-
lowing Western Oil, the court concluded that Santa Monica was
not a market participant due to its monopolistic control of the
channels of interstate commerce. 41
Drawing the line between state regulation and state market
participation is an exercise full of pitfalls. The Supreme Court has
not enumerated a test for making this distinction. 1' However, it
appears clear that when a state holds a monopoly position in a
market, the state need not engage in the usual burdens of propri-
etorship,147 and so should not be looked upon as a participant.
The state's decisions and actions are binding upon all within the
state's jurisdiction, which is the very essence of regulation. 48 In
both Western Oil and Shell, the market is entirely dependent upon
the whim of state action. By contrast, in true market participant
cases, the market is not dependent upon the actions of the state. 149
This exception to the state market participant doctrine is di-
rectly applicable to the monopoly maintained by control states over
the alcoholic beverage industry. In each case, the monopoly has
constitutional underpinnings: state sovereignty in the tenth amend-
" 830 F.2d 1052 (9th Cir. 1987).
I" Id. at 1057 ("The city controls easements in the area beneath city streets, a
commodity with value that it may sell to Shell. The city thus competes with other entities
that also might supply Shell's needs.").
141 Id. at 1057-58.
,,6 See Comment, A Proposed Model of the Sovereign/Proprietary Distinction, 133 U.
PA. L. Rav. 661, 661-64 (1985) [hereinafter Proposed Model]. "The Supreme Court's use
of the sovereign/proprietary distinction has been ad hoc and confusing." Id. at 664 (footnote
omitted).
,41 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
,41 See Proposed Model, supra note 146, at 680 ("[I1f everyone within the jurisdiction
of the governmental entity must comply with the regulation or engage in the transaction
the governmental action is coercive.").
,,1 See id. ("[I]f individuals have a genuine choice about whether to engage in the
governmental transaction, the government is not acting coercively.") (emphasis added); see
also Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law,
66 VA. L. Rav. 1073, 1127 (1980).
When a state prescribes a general rule of private conduct with respect to
purchasing, selling, or employment, it affects the market in a way that is often
distinguishable in practice if not in principle from the way it affects the market




ment and the "tacit postulates' ' 1 ° of the Constitution, and the
state liquor monopoly in the twenty-first amendment. In each case,
the commercial operation has no choice but to deal with the
monopoly-holding state if it seeks to deal with the market within
that state. 51 The state is not a participant in the market; the state
may decide how to operate without regard to market forces, which
is antithetical to the central concern of an entity participating in a
market. Without the defense of the state market participant doc-
trine, the state's actions must bear the scrutiny of the commerce
clause. The liquor pricing policies of the control states must not
interfere with interstate commerce.
CONCLUSION
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE DES MOINES WARRANTY
The Court in Reeves noted that when a state enters the mar-
ketplace as a participant, its activities are "burdened with the same
restrictions imposed on private market participants. 1 152 But when
there is no choice for private market participants but to do business
on the terms of the state, the state is not a market participant and
is bound by the constraints of the commerce clause. 13 In market
participant cases, private parties have the option of not dealing
with the state. Coercive action, on the other hand, requires private
parties to conform to state requirements if they seek to participate
in the market at all.15 4 Maryland did not require that all Maryland
registered cars be processed in-state, South Dakota firms were free
to look elsewhere for supplies of cement, and Boston contractors
were under no obligation to bid on or accept city contracts. The
Des Moines Warranty, on the other hand, is coercive because
suppliers are barred absolutely from the state market if they do
I" See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (1979) ("Any
document-particularly a constitution-is built on certain postulates or assumptions ....
The tacit postulates yielded by that ordering are as much engrained in the fabric of the
document as its express provisions.").
"I See Proposed Model, supra note 146, at 680 ("The most coercive governmental
activities are those ... to which no alternative is available.").
Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980).
" See supra notes 134-50 and accompanying text.
"14 See supra notes 140-50; see also South-Cent. Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S.
82, 95-96 (1984) ("[Reeves] strongly endorseld] the right of a State to deal with whomever
it chooses when it participates in the market, [but] it did not ... sanction the imposition
of any terms that the State might desire.").
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not comply with its provisions. 15 5 For this reason, the actions of
the state are not shielded from commerce clause scrutiny by the
state market participant doctrine. The purpose of the Warranty is
to obtain for residents of the control states the benefits of interstate
competition. 156 This is a protective activity meant to bypass the
local market and its controls on prices. Such protective actions
have been struck down when they interfere with interstate com-
merce. 57 The Warranty seeks to prevent the natural price controls
imposed by market forces from taking place by requiring a de
facto national price floor. State affirmation statutes that acted to
create such a price floor were found to violate the commerce clause
in Brown-Forman v. New York 58 and subsequent cases.'5 9 The Des
Moines Warranty likewise creates a price floor and in doing so
violates the commerce clause.
0I In Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd without
opinion, 471 U.S. 81 (1985), and Shell Oil v. City of Santa Monica, 830 F.2d 1052 (9th
Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit noted that while there were alternatives available to dealing
with the state, they were not reasonable and did not bring the state within market participant
protection. Western Oil, 726 F.2d at 1343, Shell Oil, 830 F.2d at 1057-58. The 21st
amendment precludes the existence of any alternative means of reaching the state alcoholic
beverage market. The Warranty, therefore, must be further removed than the state actions
in Western Oil and Shell Oil from market participant doctrine protection.
"I6 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
"7 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
"I' Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573
(1986).
W39 See supra notes 63-103 and accompanying text. Notably, the Wyoming Warranty
presents the same potential for conflicting regulations as did the New York law struck down
in Brown-Forman v. New York. See supra notes 66-67. The Wyoming Liquor Commission
(WLC) purchase order contains a provision requiring that the Commission be offered the
same allowances and discounts that are offered to other purchasers. It then provides:
If and when the vendor offers to the Commission a special cash or commodity
allowance, post-off or discount from the quoted price, upon conditions un-
acceptable to the Commission by reason of the Commission's policy and/or
regulation, then and in that event, the vendor shall not be relieved from the
aforesaid guarantee if and when the sales of the same brands offered to the
Commission are sold or offered by the vendor upon the same unacceptable
conditions to any purchaser, dealer, agent or agency anywhere in the United
States of America.
The WLC can burden effectively the supplier's freedom to use a competitive discount or
other marketing program outside Wyoming by refusing to allow it in Wyoming. Should the
supplier use the program in another state, the WLC would view the program as a reduction
in the floor price and demand an equal price. The supplier would find itself in a Hobson's
choice of terminating the program of which Wyoming disapproves or lowering the price to
the WLC and in so doing violating all other affirmations and warranties. Similar language
appears on the Mississippi State Tax Commission-Alcoholic Beveral Control Division
Standard Quotation and Specification Form at 6.
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Unfortunately, the Court was unwilling to use the opportunity
presented by Healy I160 to declare all affirmation practices, whether
statutory or contractual, unconstitutional.' 6' As a result, the liquor
trade in the eighteen control states shall remain constrained by
protectionist regulations that violate the commerce clause. The
possibility of additional states moving to the control group will
remain open, a not entirely radical idea in this age of neo-prohi-
bition, thereby exacerbating the restraint of interstate commerce.
The time is well past due for a suit to settle the constitutionality
of the Des Moines Warranty.
Thomas E. Rutledge
'6 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. _, 109 S. Ct. 2491 (1989) [hereinafter Healy 11
(U.S.)].
16, The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in an Amicus Curiae brief filed regarding
Healy II (U.S.), suggested to the Court that its decision extend to include all affirmation
regardless of form. See Pennsylvania Amicus Curiae Brief at 9, Healy v. Beer Inst., 491
U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 2491 (1989) ("It is essential ... that the Court's consideration of
this matter embrace not just affirmation statutes, but all affirmation practices.") (emphasis
in original).
1989-901

